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Detection and control of emerging infectious diseases 
in conﬂ  ict situations are major challenges due to multiple risk 
factors known to enhance emergence and transmission of 
infectious diseases. These include inadequate surveillance 
and response systems, destroyed infrastructure, collapsed 
health systems and disruption of disease control programs, 
and infection control practices even more inadequate than 
those in resource-poor settings, as well as ongoing insecu-
rity and poor coordination among humanitarian agencies. 
This article outlines factors that potentiate emergence and 
transmission of infectious diseases in conﬂ  ict situations and 
highlights several priority actions for their containment and 
control.
A
n emerging infectious disease is one that is either newly 
recognized in a population or involves a recognized 
pathogen affecting new or larger populations or geographic 
areas (1,2). Disease emergence is inﬂ  uenced by ecologic 
and environmental changes (e.g., agriculture, deforestation, 
droughts, ﬂ  oods), human demographics and behavior (e.g., 
population migration, urbanization, international trade and 
travel), technology and industry, microbial adaptation, and 
breakdown in public health measures (1,2).
Conﬂ  ict situations are characterized by war or civil 
strife in a country or area within a country. Affected popu-
lations may experience deﬁ  ned periods of violence (weeks 
to months), ongoing or recurrent insecurity in a protracted 
conﬂ  ict (years to decades), or long-term consequences of a 
previous (usually prolonged) war.
Conﬂ  ict may lead to the displacement of large popu-
lations into temporary settlements or camps with over-
crowding and rudimentary shelters, inadequate safe water 
and sanitation, and increased exposure to disease vectors 
during the acute phase of the emergency. In protracted and 
postconﬂ  ict situations, populations may have high rates of 
illness and mortality due to breakdown of health systems, 
ﬂ  ight of trained staff, failure of existing disease control 
programs, and destroyed infrastructure. These populations 
may be more vulnerable to infection and disease because of 
high levels of undernutrition or malnutrition, low vaccine 
coverage, or long-term stress. Long-term consequences of 
civil war can affect entire countries (such as Angola, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], or Afghanistan) 
because of chronic lack of investment in health, education, 
and public works. These conditions, which are encountered 
during or after war and conﬂ  ict, favor emergence of infec-
tious diseases. Examples of emerging infectious diseases in 
conﬂ  ict situations, where several overlapping risk factors 
are often involved, are numerous (Figure).
Risk Factors Enhancing Disease Emergence 
and Transmission in Conﬂ  ict Situations
Population Displacement and 
Environmental Conditions
Malaria had been virtually eliminated in Tajikistan in 
the early 1960s, and before 1992 only 200–300 malaria 
cases were reported annually (3). Civil strife during 1992–
1993 led to massive population displacement and deteriora-
tion in living conditions. More than 100,000 persons ﬂ  ed 
to Afghanistan, reintroducing malaria parasites when they 
returned in 1994. An outbreak ensued, which reestablished 
Plasmodium falciparum malaria in Tajikistan for ﬁ  rst time 
in 35 years (4). By 1997, 29,794 annual cases were report-
ed, although estimates were 200,000–500,000 for that year 
(3). During 1998–1999, a reemphasis on malaria control 
activities reduced the incidence of malaria by 50% within 2 
years (29,794 registered cases in 1997, 19,351 in 1998, and 
13,493 in 1999) (5).
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Lassa fever containment requires control of the rodent 
vector, good surveillance, and infection control in health-
care facilities. In West Africa, surveillance has been poor 
and the extent of Lassa fever is unknown. However, in the 
1980s an estimated >200,000 cases and 3,000–5,000 deaths 
occurred annually across this region (6). In disease-endemic 
areas of Sierra Leone and Liberia, Lassa fever causes an es-
timated 10%–16% of hospitalizations (7). Civil war in the 
Mano River Union countries (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone) in the 1990s led to >2 million displaced persons and 
is likely to have provided new opportunities for rodents to 
proliferate when persons were forced to abandon villages 
and relocate in overcrowded camps. However, numbers of 
new cases related to the conﬂ  ict are unavailable. Emergence 
of Lassa fever in camps in non–disease-endemic areas has 
been documented (World Health Organization [WHO], un-
pub. data) and is probably related to the poor condition of 
dwellings and storage of grain rations in nonsecure canvas 
sacks, which attracts rodents.
Similarly, unsanitary environmental conditions led to 
the proliferation of rats in postwar Kosovo and resulted in 
a tularemia outbreak among the displaced population from 
August 1999 through April 2000, with 327 serologically 
conﬁ  rmed cases in 21 of 29 municipalities (8). The popu-
lation had ﬂ  ed their villages because of bombings, and 
on their return several weeks later, they found destroyed 
buildings, contaminated food stores and wells, and a great-
ly increased rodent population. Control measures included 
appropriate case management, improving water and waste 
management, health education on hygiene, and protection 
of food and water sources from rats.
Breakdown in Infection Control
Poor infection control practices in healthcare facilities 
have enabled ampliﬁ  cation of outbreaks of viral hemor-
rhagic fevers (9). Medical settings have been the foci for 
several outbreaks of Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) in 
Yambuku, DRC, in 1976, in Sudan in 1976 and 1979, in 
Kikwit, DRC, in 1995, and in Gulu, Uganda, in 2000 (9). 
Compared with other resource-poor settings, conﬂ  ict situa-
tions, because of disrupted health services, may have even 
more substandard infection control, insufﬁ  cient  trained 
staff, and personal protective equipment (PPE), which 
make EHF containment difﬁ  cult. The natural reservoir for 
this disease is present in countries affected by prolonged 
civil strife, and 11 of the 17 EHF outbreaks from 1976 
through 2006 occurred in conﬂ  ict-affected countries (10). 
Two of the largest outbreaks of EHF have been in conﬂ  ict-
affected countries, with nosocomial transmission playing 
a major role. The EHF outbreak in Kikwit, DRC, was the 
second largest to date with 315 cases and had a case-fatal-
ity rate (CFR) of 81% (10). Before infection control proce-
dures were instituted in the hospital, 79 healthcare workers 
were infected compared with only 1 afterwards. These pro-
cedures included establishing an isolation facility; ensuring 
safe water, sanitation, and waste disposal; and providing 
PPE for staff (11). The Ebola outbreak in Gulu was the 
largest recorded to date (425 cases, CFR 53%), with noso-
comial transmission being 1 of 3 mechanisms of spread 
(the others were attendance at burials and unsafe home care 
of EHF patients) (12).
The outbreak of Marburg hemorrhagic fever in An-
gola from October 2004 through July 2005 was the ﬁ  rst 
outbreak in an African urban setting and the most lethal 
(374 cases, CFR 88%) (9,13). Thirty years of civil war had 
destroyed infrastructure, left roads mined, and left medical 
services with untrained staff and a persistent lack of sup-
plies (9,13). Healthcare centers were primarily responsible 
for ampliﬁ  cation of the outbreak through reuse of needles 
and syringes and use of multidose vials in healthcare cen-
ters due to poor training in safe injection practice (WHO, 
unpub. data).
Years of war in Sierra Leone during the 1990s weak-
ened health systems and led to a long-term deterioration in 
infection control practices. As a result, a nosocomial out-
break of Lassa fever occurred in Kenema District Hospi-
tal from January through April 2004. A total of 410 cases 
occurred with a CFR of 30% (Ministry of Health Sierra 
Leone and WHO, unpub. data). The outbreak started in the 
pediatric ward, where nosocomial transmission likely re-
sulted from use of contaminated multiuse vials and reuse 
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Figure. Geographic distribution of recent emerging or reemerging 
infectious disease outbreaks and countries affected by conﬂ  ict, 
1990–2006. Countries in yellow were affected by conﬂ  ict during this 
period (source: Ofﬁ  ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
World Health Organization, www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/onlinehp.
html). Symbols indicate outbreaks of emerging or reemerging 
infectious diseases during this period (source: Epidemic and 
Pandemic Alert and Response, World Health Organization, www.
who.int/csr/en). Circles indicate diseases of viral origin, stars 
indicate diseases of bacterial origin, and triangles indicate diseases 
of parasitic origin. CCHF, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever; 
SARS-CoV, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus. Conﬂ  ict and Emerging Infectious Diseases
of contaminated needles and syringes. Children discharged 
into the community were readmitted with suspected Lassa 
fever into the Lassa ward and comprised most of the pedi-
atric cases in this outbreak (14). A total of 50% of the case-
patients were <15 years of age and several deaths occurred 
among healthcare workers (14). The CFR was particularly 
high in young children (50% in those <5 years of age [132 
cases] and 71% in those <1 year of age [41 cases]). The av-
erage CFR for Lassa fever is 1% and can be as high as 15% 
in hospitalized patients (15). During outbreaks, the CFR 
can reach 50% among hospitalized patients (7).
Disruption of Disease Control Programs 
and Collapse of Health Systems
Malaria had virtually been eliminated in Afghanistan 
by the end of the 1970s after implementation of vector 
control programs in the 1960s and 1970s. However, with 
the onset of civil war in 1978, which continued almost 
without interruption until 1995, control programs col-
lapsed and enabled malaria reemergence, including P. 
falciparum malaria; >50% of the population now live 
in malaria-endemic areas (16). The number of cases has 
been decreasing since the introduction of artemisinin-
based combination therapy in the national malaria treat-
ment protocol in 2003 (Table 1) (17).
There was a signiﬁ  cant recrudescence of sleeping sick-
ness (human African trypanosomiasis) in the 1990s, pre-
dominantly in conﬂ  ict-affected Angola, DRC, and Southern 
Sudan. In particular, the DRC has had a dramatic resur-
gence of this disease as a direct consequence of conﬂ  ict. 
In 1930, >33,000 new cases were detected; by 1958, after 
active case ﬁ  nding and treatment, this incidence decreased 
to ≈1,000 new cases. Control measures were interrupted in 
the 1990s because of conﬂ  ict, which resulted in >150,000 
new cases from 1989 through 1998, with 26,000 cases in 
1998 (18). Since 1998, detection and treatment have been 
reinforced in Africa, and new cases have decreased sub-
stantially amid larger populations being screened in the 
DRC (Table 2) (19). However, despite intensiﬁ  cation of 
control measures, all major outbreaks in 2005 occurred in 
conﬂ   ict-affected countries (Angola, DRC, and Southern 
Sudan) (20).
Inadequate Surveillance and Early 
Warning and Response Systems
Surveillance systems are often weak in conﬂ  ict situa-
tions, which results in delays in detection and reporting of 
epidemics. Limited laboratory facilities and lack of exper-
tise in specimen collection may delay conﬁ  rmation of the 
causative organism. Outbreak investigation and implemen-
tation of control measures may be hampered by ﬁ  ghting, 
impeded access to populations, destroyed infrastructure, 
limited coverage of healthcare services, poorly trained 
health staff, and difﬁ  cult logistics that prevent delivery of 
drugs.
An outbreak of Marburg hemorrhagic fever in Durba 
in northeastern DRC from October 1998 through Septem-
ber 2000 was the ﬁ  rst large outbreak in rural areas under 
natural conditions (154 cases, CFR 83%). The area had 
been affected by civil war since 1997 and was controlled 
by Congolese rebels and Ugandan soldiers when the out-
break occurred. Although the outbreak was ﬁ  rst reported to 
the national authorities in October 1998 by the chief medi-
cal ofﬁ  cer for the health zone, an investigation was only 
launched after the medical ofﬁ  cer died of this disease on 
April 23, 1999 (21). This Marburg fever outbreak was con-
ﬁ  rmed on May 6, and an international team arrived at the 
government’s request on May 8. Given that the area was 
difﬁ  cult to access because of security problems and poor 
communications and transport infrastructure, the outbreak 
was already decreasing by the time the international team 
arrived. Only 8 cases were laboratory conﬁ  rmed, and 68 
were identiﬁ  ed retrospectively by the team, which left after 
3 weeks (21). Sporadic cases continued to occur until Sep-
tember 2000, although data were collected retrospectively 
by a second international team.
Before the implementation of the Early Warning and 
Response Network in Southern Sudan in 1999 by WHO in 
collaboration with local authorities and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), it took 6 months to respond to a re-
lapsing fever outbreak in 1998, which resulted in >400,000 
cases and >2,000 deaths. In 2000, alerts of a relapsing fever 
outbreak were received within 1 week and responded to by 
a local team; the outbreak was contained within 2 weeks, 
resulting in only 154 cases and 8 deaths (22).
Impeded Access to Populations
Ongoing conﬂ  ict can hamper access to populations for 
timely delivery of supplies and implementation of control 
measures during an outbreak. Several outbreaks of pneu-
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Table 1. Officially reported malaria cases in Afghanistan, 2002–
2005
Year No.  cases  Plasmodium falciparum confirmed 
2002 629,839 83,783
2003 586,602 44,243
2004 261,456 9,212
2005 281,888 5,017
Table 2. New cases of trypanosomiasis per year, total population 
screened, and no. mobile teams for active case finding, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Year  New cases  Total screened  Mobile teams 
1930 >33,000 3,000,000 Unknown 
1958 1,218 6,000,000 250
1992 5,825 525,464 4
1998 26,318 1,472,674 33
2003 10,900 2,700,000 40PERSPECTIVE
monic plague have been documented in Oriental Province 
in northeastern DRC, where war has hampered control ef-
forts. Outbreaks occurred in a camp for mine workers in the 
Bas-Uele District (134 cases, CFR 43%) from December 
2004 through March 2005 (23) and in the Ituri District (100 
cases, CFR 19%) from May through June 2006 (24). In 
these outbreaks, achieving humanitarian access to relevant 
sites was difﬁ  cult because of security problems, which de-
layed travel by response teams for investigation and imple-
mentation of control.
Access to populations to conduct vaccination cam-
paigns may also be interrupted for months to years during 
protracted conﬂ  ict due to long-term inadequacies in cold 
chain and logistics or ongoing insecurity. Low vaccine cov-
erage has played the major role in reemergence of polio-
myelitis in conﬂ  ict-affected countries and has also pushed 
back global polio eradication targets. Conﬂ  ict in Somalia 
since 1991 resulted in polio vaccination coverage for the 
required 3 polio doses being only 35% in 2005 (25). Soma-
lia had been free of polio since 2002 when a large outbreak 
occurred in Mogadishu in 2005. By September 2006, 14 
of the 19 regions in Somalia were affected with 215 cases 
(26). In May 2004, a patient infected with poliovirus was 
conﬁ  rmed during the Darfur conﬂ  ict, the ﬁ  rst case in Su-
dan since 2001. By January 2005, a total of 105 cases had 
been conﬁ  rmed in 17 of the 26 states in Sudan (27). Six 
rounds of national immunization campaigns vaccinated 8.1 
million children <5 years of age in 2005, with the last case 
reported in June 2005. A total of 154 cases were reported in 
the 2004–2005 outbreak (28).
Interruption of routine immunization programs com-
bined with forced migration of populations caused by 
conﬂ  ict has also contributed to the resurgence of yellow 
fever in Africa (29). This resurgence began with the 1990 
epidemic in Cameroon, then spread into conﬂ  ict-affected 
West Africa, which since 1995 has been the most affected 
African region. Ten countries in Africa at risk from yellow 
fever have been affected by conﬂ  ict, and multiple outbreaks 
have occurred in 6 of them: Angola (1988), Liberia (1995, 
1996, 1997, 2000, 2001, and 2004), Sierra Leone (2003), 
Côte d’Ivoire (2000 and 2001), Guinea (2001 and 2005), 
and Sudan (2003 and 2005). The 2005 outbreak in Sudan 
resulted in a high CFR of 25% (30).
Development of Drug Resistance
Pathogen resistance to drugs can contribute to disease 
emergence. Resistance may develop more rapidly in con-
ﬂ  ict situations because of inappropriate diagnoses or in-
appropriate drug regimens and outdated drugs. Treatment 
compliance may be poor because of purchase of insufﬁ  -
cient quantities of drugs, selling or saving of them by pa-
tients, or interrupted treatment with sudden displacement 
or irregular access to healthcare facilities. In addition, pri-
vate pharmacies, which can ﬂ  ourish in conﬂ  ict situations 
because of no regulation, can compound this problem with 
drugs of unknown quality and acceptance of prescriptions 
from unqualiﬁ  ed prescribers.
In an outbreak of Shigella dysenteriae type 1 infection 
in a Rwandan camp for Burundian refugees ﬂ  eeing civil 
war in 1993, <50% of patients complied with their 5-day 
antimicrobial drug treatment. A high attack rate of 32% 
was observed among 20,000 people in that camp, with a 
CFR of 4%. S. dysenteriae type 1 isolated from 3 of 7 stool 
samples was resistant to nalidixic acid (31). Refugee popu-
lations had higher anti-tuberculosis (TB) drug resistance 
rates than nonrefugee populations in northeastern Kenya. 
Drug resistance to >1 drug was observed in 18% of newly 
diagnosed sputum-positive TB patients (with multidrug re-
sistance in 3%) in refugee populations compared with 5% 
(and no multidrug resistance) in nonrefugee populations 
(32). A study of patients receiving short-course therapy for 
TB in an active war zone in Somalia during 1994–1995 
showed that although treatment completion or cure was 
achieved in 70% of pulmonary TB patients, 14.5% of pa-
tients defaulted treatment (33), which is almost double the 
acceptable default rate limit for TB control programs in 
such settings (34).
Movement of Refugees and Aid Workers
International spread of infectious diseases from con-
ﬂ  ict situations may occur through movement of refugees, 
relief workers, animals, goods, and private sector employ-
ees working in mining, oil, logging, or construction indus-
tries. A prolonged outbreak of hepatitis E virus in a camp in 
Darfur, Sudan, in May 2004 had >2,600 cases in 6 months, 
an attack rate of 3.3%, and a CFR of 1.7% (35). The out-
break occurred during an acute conﬂ  ict in a setting with >1 
million displaced persons crowded into camps with little 
access to safe water because of drought and inadequate 
sanitation. The outbreak subsequently spread into neigh-
boring eastern Chad in June 2004 because of movement of 
Sudanese refugees ﬂ  eeing Darfur.
Rebuilding and rehabilitation efforts in postconﬂ  ict 
Sierra Leone have placed aid workers, United Nations 
peacekeeping forces, and businessmen at risk for contract-
ing Lassa fever and enabled importation of cases to indus-
trialized countries. Deaths from Lassa fever occurred in 
humanitarian workers in 2000, including United Nations 
peacekeepers (36,37). An imported case of Lassa fever 
was conﬁ  rmed in Germany in July 2006, after the patient, 
a Sierra Leonean resident, ﬂ  ew from Freetown to Frank-
furt through Abidjan and Brussels, 5 days after symptom 
onset (36). A businessman born in Liberia and residing in 
the United States died of Lassa fever in 2004 after traveling 
between Sierra Leone and Liberia before his illness (38). 
Aid workers and British soldiers have imported Lassa fever 
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into the Netherlands (2000) and the United Kingdom (2000 
and 2003) after postings in Lassa-endemic areas of Sierra 
Leone (36).
There is also a hypothetical possibility that aid workers 
returning from a containment zone of an emerging infec-
tious disease, such as novel pandemic inﬂ  uenza, may intro-
duce the virus causing this pandemic into conﬂ  ict settings. 
This introduction may reduce the time for preparedness, 
which can lead to increased illness, death, and social dis-
ruption in these already vulnerable populations.
Improving Detection and Control of 
Infectious Diseases in Conﬂ  ict Situations 
Detection and control of many emerging infectious 
diseases primarily require a functional healthcare system. 
This system involves investment in primary healthcare in-
frastructure, human resources, training, and provision of 
essential drugs, supplies, vaccines, and equipment. NGOs, 
United Nations agencies, and international organizations 
are providing crucial humanitarian assistance to many con-
ﬂ  ict-affected populations in coordination with relevant au-
thorities.
In such settings, good hygiene and standard infection 
control precautions in health facilities are needed to reduce 
the potential for nosocomial transmission and ampliﬁ  cation 
of disease. Correct guidance must be given on the rationale 
for infection control and use of PPE and isolation according 
to an assessment potential exposure and risk for infection. 
This guidance must be supported by ensuring a sustained 
supply of PPE, soap, disinfectants, sterilizing material, and 
single-use injection supplies so that shortages do not occur 
and force breaches in infection control.
It is imperative that the technical capacity of all hu-
manitarian health partners and ministries of health regard-
ing disease surveillance, prevention, and control in con-
ﬂ   ict-affected countries be enhanced to ensure effective 
implementation of infectious disease interventions. This 
implementation can be achieved through availability of 
internationally accepted standards, guidelines, and tools 
adapted to conﬂ  ict situations, which can be supported by 
speciﬁ  c training of health planners and health facility staff, 
and rapid mobilization of international experts to provide 
technical ﬁ  eld support as required. As in resource-poor set-
tings, building the capacity of national staff must be an in-
tegral part of program implementation, especially in times 
of heightened insecurity, when staff often remain behind in 
areas and continue working.
Data on disease incidence and trends are essential for 
prioritizing risks and planning interventions and should be 
obtained through disease surveillance and early warning 
and response systems. Several of these systems have been 
implemented in conﬂ  ict situations. These systems include 
those in Southern Sudan and for Kosovar refugees in Al-
bania in 1999, in Darfur, Sudan, in 2004, and in Basrah 
Governorate, Iraq, in 2003, and resulted in early detection 
and response to outbreaks of EHF in Yambio in Southern 
Sudan in 2005, hepatitis E in Darfur in 2004, and cholera 
in Basrah in 2003.
Surveillance systems rely on close partnerships with 
NGOs, international organizations, and community groups 
and are built on resources and capacities of all organiza-
tions present. Effective surveillance systems in emergencies 
have involved selecting a small number of syndrome-based 
priority events, using standard surveillance forms, simpli-
fying case deﬁ  nitions, health facilities weekly reporting of 
data, immediate reporting if set alert thresholds are passed, 
and establishing community mechanisms for identifying 
disease clusters.
Epidemic preparedness measures to be taken should 
involve training staff to use surveillance tools and manage 
cases of epidemic-prone diseases and equipping them with 
reliable means of communication. Isolation facilities and 
laboratories for pathogen conﬁ  rmation must be identiﬁ  ed in 
advance, and support must be provided to local institutions 
regarding training and supplying equipment and reagents. 
Mechanisms should be formulated for specimen transport 
and stockpiling of essential drugs, supplies, and outbreak 
investigation kits. Data should be analyzed locally and reg-
ular feedback provided (e.g., a weekly bulletin) to health 
partners. A rapid response mechanism for investigation 
alerts and implementation of control measures as outlined 
in outbreak preparedness plans (e.g., by an interagency out-
break control committee) are also crucial.
Revised International Health Regulations of 2005 pro-
vide a global legal framework to guide response to public 
health events of international concern. Conﬂ  ict-affected 
countries represent one of the weakest links in global health 
security and should be prioritized by the international com-
munity in provision of technical and operational support 
to implement core capacities for detection and response to 
epidemics.
Military forces are increasingly implementing aid pro-
grams for conﬂ  ict-affected populations. These programs 
have a crucial role and are a valuable resource. However, 
military aid can affect the neutrality of humanitarian aid. 
A consistent and transparent policy is needed for military 
humanitarian interventions, as well as extensive civil-mili-
tary liaisons and close cooperation with other humanitarian 
agencies (39).
Given that healthcare in conﬂ  ict situations is delivered 
by a wide range of national and international agencies, ex-
tensive collaboration between relevant health authorities 
and implementing partners should be encouraged. During 
an international response to an outbreak, coordination be-
tween partners and national authorities is usually ensured 
by WHO, which can also mobilize international experts 
  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 13, No. 11, November 2007  1629 PERSPECTIVE
from various institutions belonging to its Global Outbreak 
Alert and Response Network.
Detection, containment, and control of emerging in-
fectious diseases in conﬂ  ict situations are major challenges 
because of multiple risk factors that promote disease trans-
mission and hinder control even more than those in many 
resource-poor settings. Beyond the global public health im-
perative to prevent the emergence and international spread 
of infectious diseases, there is also a moral imperative to 
alleviate the effects of these diseases on already vulnerable 
conﬂ  ict-affected populations.
Dr Gayer works for WHO in Geneva. Her research interests 
include infectious disease surveillance, monitoring, and control in 
conﬂ  ict situations and after natural disasters.
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